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The World Economy 
should be treated with some caution, however 
ties concerning the relations between Iran and the United States. 
There are some signs to suggest that 
the world economy will withstand the 
1979 oil price shock better than it 
did in 1973/74. The main difference 
is that the 1979 price rise was not 
super-imposed on as severe an 
inflation as that which occurred on 
the previous occasion. The present 
rate of increase in the world prices 
should not reach the levels of the 
last cycle when the twelve month 
increase in manufacturing prices 
peaked at 23%. Advance warning by 
US economists that 1979 was going to 
be a year of difficulty did not go 
unnoticed by businessmen in that 
country who took steps in 1978 to 
avoid a repetition of the inventory 
boom and bust cycle which had proved 
so costly in the recession of 1973/74. 
Also, consumer expectations are 
adjusting towards a continuing rise in 
the price of oil. 
Official forecasts for the OECD area 
predict that GNP might grow by about 
1% between 1979 and 1980 if there is 
no further substantial rise in the 
real price of oil. A deceleration 
of growth of GNP in the first half of 
the year to an annual rate of around 
1% is forecast, perhaps being 
followed by a recovery in the second 
half to about 1J%. These forecasts 
given present political uncertain-
All industrial countries are experiencing accelerating inflation this year, although 
the rate of increase differs from country to country. Interest rates have 
increased substantially, influenced by the desire to control domestic inflationary 
pressures and in some cases to protect exchange rates. There has been a general-
ised tightening of monetary policies in nearly all OECD countries. 
In the United States, the Consumer Price Index suddenly took off in January and 
February at an annual rate of nearly 20%. The main short-term causes were 
December's OPEC price increases and high domestic interest rates. President 
Carter's fourth anti inflation package announced in March is considered to be far 
from adequate. 
'Forecasts of GNP in the US predict a negative growth rate of 2.4% for the first 
half of 1980, followed by some recovery in the second half of the year. Industrial 
production is expected to decline by 2% in 1980 over 1979 levels. 
There is growing concern in the United States about the country's declining indus-
trial performance. It has been pointed out that capital formation in the American 
economy at only 13% of GDP during the 1970's compares unfavourably with Japan's 
20%, France's 16% and even the UK's 15%. 
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West Germany is heading for slower economic growth in 1980, combined with higher 
inflation. The rate of inflation in March rose to 5.8%, the highest yearly rate 
since October 1975. The authoritative IFO institute expects overall production 
in manufacturing industries to grow this year by only 2%, compared with a 5% 
increase in 1979. There is likely to be a current account deficit in 1980 of 
close to DM20bn compared with DM9bn last year. This deficit, caused primarily 
by the higher oil price, has led ministers to appeal for moderation in the current 
wage round. One optimistic development is that the powerful public service 
union has agreed to a modest 6.3% wage increase. Most German research institutes 
agree that the investment climate is good and this will increase demand for capital 
goods and benefit such sectors as the electronics industry. 
Recent figures reveal that Japan's real economic growth in the last quarter of 1979 
was 1.3%. The annual growth rate of 5.3% should be maintained throughout 
the first half of 1980 after which it is expected to fall to around 4%. The 
latest GNP figures show that the bulk of last quarter's growth derived from the 
external sector. Exports grew by 6.6% while imports expanded by only 1%. The 
trend is liable to accelerate due to the weaker Japanese currency, thus rekindling 
fears of trade tensions. The annual rate of inflation rose to 7.6% in February 
and could be 9% by the end of this year. This has prompted the government to 
introduce a package of anti-inflation measures which is likely to centre on a „ 
slowdown in the growth of public expenditure and a further tightening of credit. 
The balance of payments deficit is expected to have widened considerably in the 
second half of 1979 to an annual rate of around $13Jbillion but may be reduced 
during 1980. 
In France, real GDP and industrial production growth may not exceed 2% in 1980. 
The rate of increase in consumer prices might rise from about 10-75% in 1979 to 
around 11.5% in 1980. The visible trade deficit may widen from about $1.5billion 
in 1979 to $4|billion in 1980. However the balance on invisibles should 
stabilise in 1980 with a surplus of about $3billion resulting in an overall 
current account deficit of around $lJbillion. 
Economic growth in Italy is likely to come to a halt in the second half of this 
year with unemployment rising above 8%. The cost of living is expected to rise 
by an average 19%. 
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The bare bones of the official outlook 
for the UK economy over the next six 
months was published in the Financial 
Statement which appeared with the 
Budget on 27 March, 
The UK 
Economy 
Real GDP is expected to fall by 2J% 
from mid-year 1980. Thereafter, it 
is assumed to grow at an average 
annual rate of 1% for the next four 
years. 
The retail price index is expected to 
increase by 16J% from the fourth 
quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter 
of 1980. This rate of increase is 
expected to fall to 13i% between the 
second quarter of 1980 and the second 
quarter of 1981. Beyond this period, 
the Government are unwilling to make 
their expectations about price 
increases known, 
The money supply (M3) is expected to 
grow by 9% from mid-February 1980 to 
mid-April 1981. 
The Government, however, clearly 
attaches very much greater importance to the next few years than it does to the 
next twelve months. The Chancellor announced in his Budget speech what he called 
"a medium-term strategy" to cover the period until the end of the financial year 
1983/84. The objections of this strategy are two-fold: 
(a) to reduce the rate of inflation 
and (b) to provide a sufficient surplus of government revenue over expenditure 
to make possible substantial cuts in personal taxation during the years 
1982/83 and 1983/84. 
The characteristic features of the strategy are equally simply stated: 
(1) A progressively lower annual rate of growth on the money supply (M3), to 
some 6% by 1983/84. 
(2) A progressively lower annual PSBR (public sector borrowing requirement), 
to some £2Jbillion by 1983/84. 
(3) Total Government expenditure to fall at an annual rate of some 1% from 
1980/81 to 1983/84. 
The figures quoted in the last two items are in real terms (constant 1978/79 prices) 
and it is assumed that tax rates will remain unchanged and allowances adjusted for 
inflation. 
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The budget statement, of which these are the central features, has marked a water-
shed in post-war British economic policy. For this reason, we believe it is worth 
devoting the whole of this section to a discussion of its main features. This 
budget can be said to represent a watershed for two distinct but related reasons. 
First, it implicitly repudiates the economic reasoning upon which all budgetary 
policy (of both parties) has been built since 1945. Post-war doctrine has always 
been that when faced with a decline in economic activity, government should provide 
a stimulus to aggregate demand by acting to increase its expenditure and/or lower 
its tax revenues. Faced with the largest expected downturn in economic activity 
since the war, the present government is acting to lower its expenditure and 
increase its tax revenues, and says it will continue to do this for the next three 
years. Secondly, the budget statement is deliberately vague about numerical 
estimates. No forecasts are offered of the rates of inflation or of unemployment 
beyond the next twelve months. Other than the money supply, and the PSBR, it is 
clear that the government attaches slight importance to even its own estimates of 
other economic variables. It is significant that the Chancellor refers to his 
policy, not as a plan or a forecast, but a strategy. Pressed for his estimate of 
future rates of inflation or unemployment, the Chancellor will reply that he simply 
does not know. 
These two novel features of the 1980 budget are related by the fact that the 
development of "Keynesian economics" as the post-war budgetary doctrine came to be 
known, was closely associated with the development of forecasting models according 
to which economists specified the ways in which aggregate variables in the economy 
would behave in relation to each other. Aggregate consumer spending, aggregate 
investment spending, total output, total government spending, the average level of 
consumer prices, and the average rate of unemployment were all moved in a system-
atic way with respect to each other, a way which was understood and represented in 
a range of macro economic models. The government is now saying, in effect, that 
it does not believe in some of the most important of these relationships, and that 
the margins of probable error in others are so great that little of certainty can 
be said*. 
Questioned on some assumptions behind the budget by the House of Commons Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee, a senior Treasury official replied that if the growth 
rate of the economy failed to match the government's expectations, its response 
would be to raise tax rates by whatever amount was necessary to raise the necessary 
tax revenues. This reply summarises three themes which run through the 
Chancellor's Speech, the Financial Statement, and the Public Expenditure White Paper. 
First, it is anti-Keynesian, secondly it is anti-quantitative and, thirdly, it 
reveals the priority attached to the monetary target above all others. 
Such a sweeping change of direction in economic policy has implications which 
require more space than can be afforded to discuss them here. Three points will 
be raised, however, which seem to be the most important. 
First, assuming that the Government's strategy is broadly correct, (and no 
convincing alternative has yet been advanced), does it have the political will to 
carry it through? The recent award of an 18% pay increase to civil servants, 
coming on top of last year's award of 25% suggests that it either cannot or will 
not cut government expenditure in certain areas. 
It is ironic that the government appointed as its Chief Economic Adviser someone 
who was the longest-running forecaster in the business! 
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Secondly, the public expenditure white paper reveals that the government is aiming 
at halting the drain of the nationalised industries upon the Exchequer by elimin-
ating their overall deficits (presently some £2.2 billion) over the next three 
years. If this is done, as in the past, by requiring them to raise the prices of 
their products, then of course that will directly contradict the ultimate objective 
of reducing the rate of inflation. If, on the other hand, it is done by improving 
the aggregate productivity of their industries, then this will require quite 
radical changes in some of their organisation, incentives and attitudes, about 
which neither the government nor the relevant civil service departments have had 
(apparently) any thoughts. 
Thirdly, in their obsession with aggregate monetary and fiscal variables, the 
government are in danger of falling into the same trap as their "Keynesian" 
predecessors. As Professor Bain pointed out in his special article in the last 
Commentary* it is not so much the size of the PSBR which matters. If, as he says, 
it were acting as a channel through which private saving would flow into investment, 
a high PSBR could be positively advantageous. In the last decade, this has not 
happened, and indeed the present government is planning to cut severely government 
investment at a time when even the most dedicated anti-Keynesian would agree that 
it should be increased, 
The third point, then, is that very little about the performance of the economy can 
be deduced from the aggregates themselves. There are very serious institutional 
and fiscal obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources in both the private 
and the public sectors of the economy. Aside from a commendable package of 
measures to induce the growth of output and employment in smaller firms, the 
budget makes no reference to this problem. Even if the government were to succeed 
in every particular in realising the objectives stated in this budget, it would 
still leave untouched the fundamental problems inhibiting the performance of the 
economy. However, it need not worry. By 1983/84 the annual oil revenues from 
the North Sea will amount to some 6% of the Gross Domestic Product of the United 
Kingdom, and should serve to conceal these problems for a further five to ten 
years. 
3|C 
A D Bain, "Is Public Sector Borrowing too High?" Quarterly Economic 
Commentary Vol 5 No 3, January 1980. 
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